We construct a theory of forward guidance in economic policy making in order to provide a framework to explain the role and strategic advantages of including forward guidance as an explicit part of policy design. We do this by setting up a general policy problem in which forward guidance plays a role, and then examine the consequences for performance when that guidance is withdrawn. Following Acocella et al. (2013) , who revisit the classical theory of economic policy in a world with rational expectations, we show that forward guidance provides enhanced controllability and stabilizability -especially where such properties may not otherwise be available. As a bi-product we find that forward guidance limits the scope and incentives for time inconsistent behavior in an economy whose policy goals are ultimately reachable. It also adds to the credibility of a set of policies therefore.
Introduction
John Williams, President of the San Francisco Federal Reserve and member of the Fed's Open Market Committee, has argued that forward guidance and large scale asset purchases (popularly known as Quantitative Easing) are now the leading and most important forms of unconventional monetary policy (Williams, 2011) . Both techniques were used extensively to engineer a recovery from the Great Financial Crisis of 2008-12, in the United States and elsewhere. 1 But, whereas Quantitative Easing has been studied in some detail 2 and is comparatively well understood in terms of how it is supposed to work, if not in terms of how large an impact it has had in practice, forward guidance has been equally widely used but with little understanding of how and in what circumstances it can work successfully, what the drawbacks might be, and what its impact might be. In short, we lack a proper analysis of the strategic value of forward guidance as a tool of monetary policy -both in general and in difficult circumstances.
Forward guidance may be defined as announcements made about the future stance of policy with the intention of influencing or managing expectations of future policy interventions, and hence the expected path of future outcomes for the economy. 3 It may be unconditional and/or indefinite ("interest rates will remain low for a considerable period of time"); or conditional ("interest rates will remain low until unemployment falls below 6.5%") or time dependent ("for two years"). 4 It can be applied to achieve either controllability (the intention to achieve certain target values at a specified date in the future), or stabilizability (the ability to stabilize the economy about a certain path, be it one which leads to the desired target values or a continuation of the current policies, whatever shocks may yet emerge).
1 Prominent examples, in the recent past, have been the UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Sweden. 2 Williams (2011) , Ugai (2007) , Gagnon et al.(2011) , Joyce et al. (2012) , and referencese therein. 3 We do not consider forward guidance in the form of announcements made about the policy maker's projections on the future path of the economy here, although that is always possible and is indeed implied by the projections of the policy instruments -given access to a model of the economy and a matching information set. 4 See .
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Forward guidance is therefore designed to make the private sector's expectations consistent with the policy intentions of the central bank or government with respect to interest rates, growth and investment -especially at the zero lower bound (Coeuré, 2013) . There is some evidence that it has reduced the volatility of expectations (Coeuré 2013; Filardo and Hofmann 2014) . On that view, the Governor of the Bank of Canada has argued that forward guidance is best used for stabilization, especially at the zero lower bound.
The literature on forward guidance is, at this point, rather limited and restricted to a few specific problems or circumstances. A natural concern is whether forward guidance statements have had a perceptible impact on expectations. Kool and Thornton (2012) argue that they have not, at least not in the context of monetary policy in four leading OECD economies. On the other side, Campbell et al. (2012) argue that they did in the US when viewed over a longer sample period . Then again, Del Negro et al. (2013) suggest that our standard models often overestimate the size of these impacts. Obviously the jury is still out on that question.
Unsurprisingly given recent history, much of the theoretical work has been done in the context of interest rates being stuck at their zero lower bound. Here, for example, Gavin et al. (2013) find forward guidance announcements have the power to lower interest rates, prompting consumption and output to recover, if private sector expectations adjust -more so, the longer the horizon. However, in an important qualification, Levin et al. (2010) warn that the stability of the economy may be at risk. They find that, given moderate negative shocks, forward guidance can be used to stabilize the system, but conjecture that large negative shocks (such as would appear in a big recession) will overwhelm the forward guidance effects and leave us unable to stabilize the economy. But whether that is a result of large shocks, or of insufficiently responsive policies or inadequately chosen forward guidance, is a moot point. These results prompt another line of thought: that the effectiveness of forward guidance may depend on the form of guidance offeredspecifically whether it is Delphic (the expectations offered are in terms of outcomes; such as would be the case when trying to escape a serious recession), or Odyssean (the 6 expectations offered are in terms of a policy rule, or contingency plans defining how the authorities will react to certain conditions). 6 This mirrors the unconditional vs. conditional forward guidance, with an exit strategy, distinction made in .
In trying to construct a theory of forward guidance, any formal analysis must fit within a general theory of policy announcements (Hughes Hallett and others 2012a,b; Acocella et al.
2014)
7 . Any such theory needs an understanding of the strategic advantages offered by forward guidance, its role in the policy arsenal, its value in terms of overall economic performance, and whether the expectations generated would be sustained or dissipated by time inconsistent revisions. That is the subject of this paper.
Starting from the framework in Acocella et al. (2013) , we proceed by examining the advantages of policy rules which contain forward guidance, and then explore what is lost if those guidance terms are removed. Section 2 presents a generic economic model with rational expectations. Section 3 deals with conditions for controllability of this model, while Section 4 derives the corresponding conditions for stabilizability. Section 5 illustrates these concepts using two simple examples to explain the role of forward guidance; and underline the value of providing forward guidance in a policy rule where the private sector has, and reacts to, rational expectations of future outcomes. This leads to conclusions rather different from those appearing elsewhere in the existing literature (Section 6).
Economic Models with Forward Looking Expectations
Without loss of generality, we can write the generic linear RE model in its reduced form for a single policy authority, as follows: Finally t v is a vector of exogenous shocks or other influences on , with known mean but which comes from an unspecified probability distribution. Note also that the policy authority may have q ≤ S explicit targets, but that the m instruments are assumed to be linearly independent. Thus, ∈ and ∈ .
This model can now be solved from the perspective of any particular period, say t = 1, by putting it into its final form conditional on the information available in that period:
Although equation (1) has been solved from the point of view of Ω 1 , it is understood that it could be derived for each Ω t , t = 1,...,T, in turn, where
if jt  ; similarly for u and v.
The equation to which (2) is the solution makes it clear that neither policymakers, nor the private sector are required to make expectation errors for the policies to work as planned. In fact, equation (3) below shows just the opposite: those expectations are exactly consistent with what the private sector expects the outcomes to be. It then only remains to discover if 8 There is no indeterminacy problem here. The dynamic conditions which guarantee the existence of a solution are automatically satisfied, given any particular information set, if the inverse in (2) exists -which we show to be true below. Given that inverse, Hughes Hallett and Fisher (1988) show that the saddle point property (that the system has the correct number of stable and unstable roots to ensure a solution, Blanchard and Khan (1980) ) is satisfied. One implication is that it no longer matters what the value of the terminal condition is (or if none is specified) so long as the policy horizon is far enough away (T  ). Indeterminacy may however follow for smaller values of T if +1/1 cannot be specified.
it is possible to shift expectations in such a way that the economy's outcomes can reach certain specified target values at certain points of time.
It is easy to show that this final form solution always exists since the inverse matrix in (2) is well defined provided the matrix product AC does not contain a unit root (Hughes Hallett et al, 2012b) .
Controllability
We can now write the model in final form in the following way: Proof. See Hughes Hallett et al. (2012b) . ■ Hallett et al. (2012b) . ■ 9 For convenience we have assumed that the number of instruments and targets does not vary over time.
Multi-period dynamic controllability

Comment 1.
It is important to see why time inconsistency will not appear here.
Controllability at period t means that, barring unforeseen shocks, the policymaker will be able to reach his desired values for y t in expectation. Hence, y t|t = y t|1 = t y are fixed or at least known quantities. But y 1|t = y 1|1 is fixed by history; and u 1|t =u 1|1 likewise. It is then easy to see that, if nothing else changes, u t|t = u t|1 . The policymaker is of course free to set u t|t ≠ u t|1 . But he would never do so because t y is his first best value and is reachable given no information changes or unforeseen shocks. Policy makers have no incentive, still less a strategic interest, in choosing to make themselves worse off than they need to be.
Could time inconsistency not emerge as new shocks appear over time? Comment 1 says that time inconsistency would never appear, and that will remain true unless: a) there are too few instruments to control the targets in any time period (m<S: static controllability doesn't apply at any t); and b) there are too few time periods between the current period, and the time at which the target values are to be achieved, for the available instruments to reach the number of targets remaining (S/m<t where t is the date by which the desired targets are to be attained: the rank condition for dynamic controllability no longer applies).
Thus comment 1 remains true for all time periods. However, if t remains fixed, the possibility of those conditions holding becomes larger as we go further into the policy period (i.e as t-t c gets smaller, where t c is the current period). But if that happens when the policy revisions are driven by shocks or new information, they are not an example of time inconsistency, but of contingency planning. No rational policymaker would fail to react to new information to correct his policy settings when there is new information or the old information was wrong. But we don't say they are being time inconsistent when they do that. It is just a normal feature of any feedback regime, including those without rational expectations and hence no chance of time inconsistent behavior.
Stabilizability under Rational Expectations
We can apply the reasoning underlying Theorem 2 to show that any economy can be stabilized to an arbitrary degree under rational, forward looking expectations if it is also dynamically controllable. An arbitrary degree of stabilization means that policy rules can be found to make the economy follow an arbitrarily stable path, based on an arbitrary set of eigenvalues, such that it returns to the original path following a shock (Wonham, 1974 
where 0|1 For an economy to be stabilizable at t, it must possess the property that it would return to the initially expected path, whatever the initial conditions and shocks experienced up to that point, given no further shocks or changes in expectations appear (Wonham, 1974) . This property will exist if the iteration matrix, RK, has its roots inside the unit circle. But we can go further. Any particular | 1 t y will follow an arbitrarily stable path if we can pick exists and that R  is always available. ■ Comment 2. Note that the policy rules described in Theorem 3 are both forward and backward looking in that they react to expected future developments, including to the effects of these rules applied in the future, and to feedback from past outcomes (past "failures") -in exactly the same way as the private agents in the economy have been assumed to do.
Comment 3. Thus we can infer that a RE model which is dynamically controllable at t = 1 in the sense of Theorem 2, is also stabilizable from t = 1. Hence Theorem 3 generalizes on
Wonham's theorem, where stabilizability can be achieved for the first time only in period S.
However it is not generally possible to dispense with the feed-forward part of the policy rule for the obvious reason that it has to control both the feed-forward and feedback behavior of private agents.
Comment 4.
The key lesson therefore is that, in models with forward looking behavior, the closed loop (as opposed to feedback) characteristics of our policy rules are of special importance. Closed loop means reacting to changes in expectations of future events as they appear, in addition to past outcomes as they deviate from plan. instead. Given that, we can recast (10) as a particular case of (7) ; and c   . In this case, x t is the policy instrument (interest rate); and y t is the policy target (inflation). We can now investigate the ability to stabilize, based on our notion of controllability, using Theorem 3. Consider now two different decision rules for managing (7): a) with no forward looking elements, 
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We substitute (11) or (12) into (7) respectively, where * = + 2 . Renormalizing (13) and (14) on their lead terms, then taking expectations conditional on information available in period t, and dropping the superscript "e" for simplicity, leaves us with two alternative models to be stabilized:
It is already obvious that (15) presents us with only one opportunity, via the choice of 1 , to choose the coefficients and thus the roots of the economy under control. Yet there are two roots. In fact, it will not be possible to stabilize this economy with a simple feedback rule at all, unless b>1, let alone to do so up to an arbitrary pair of eigenvalues.
Equation (16), by contrast, gives us the opportunity to choose two coefficients, and hence both characteristic roots in the economy under control, given our freedom to choose both 1 and d. Hence, this system is stabilizable, and stabilizable up to an arbitrary set of eigenvalues.
We demonstrate these two claims as follows. The roots of equation (15) which means that we can stabilize the system with a simple feedback rule, but only if the system is already stable (b>1). This case is not of much interest, therefore
Notice that stabilizability here is determined by the coefficients of the model -not by the policy rule. So it is correct to say that a forward looking New Keynesian model may not be stabilized by a Taylor rule. But if instability follows, the fault lies not with the rule, but with the model. Taylor rules do not, in themselves, destabilize the economy.
By contrast, if we use a forward looking rule like (12), the controlled economy will behave as in equation (16 
Conclusions
In this paper we have outlined a general theory of forward guidance for policymaking. We have used entirely conventional assumptions about an economy under rational expectations, on the model used to represent it, and on the way private sector expectations are formed and can be exploited by the policymaker. We have thus provided a framework to explain the role and strategic advantages of including forward guidance as an explicit policy tool, and to underline the adverse consequences for performance when that guidance is withdrawn. What this paper shows is that forward guidance is an essential component of any policy rule in an economy which is subject to forward looking anticipations of future behavior.
i) Given the rank condition in theorem 2, forward guidance is a necessary condition to secure stabilizability and/or controllability (the ability to stabilize around and ultimately reach specified values for the target variables).
ii) An economy that is controllable for a certain set of target variables and time horizon, is also stabilizable for those targets and time horizon. And if it is stabilizable, it is controllable. So it is only necessary to test the rank condition in theorem 2 before applying forward guidance.
iii) Without forward guidance that provides the private sector with information about the policy maker's future intentions, the economy may not be stabilizable; and will in general not be controllable with respect to any given target values either.
iv) The stabilizability and controllability properties conferred by forward guidance take effect immediately, from period t=1, rather than after t periods delay as would be the case in an economy without anticipations effects.
v) Forward guidance therefore accelerates the required policy impacts. It offers the policymaker the opportunity to control the economy from any date, as the private sector anticipates his future behavior and knows that he can control the economy.
vi) Time inconsistency is not a problem under forward guidance unless there are insufficient policy instruments and policymakers are impatient (have very short horizons).
Specifically there is no reason to suppose that policymakers acting in their own interest will show time inconsistent behavior unless both m<S and S/m<t, where t is the date by which stability or the desired target values are to be attained.
